



UNSC

## 1 LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

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Hi,

My name is Fatema Kinkhabwala and I'll be the Chairperson for the United Nations Security Council at Podar Summit 2019. Model UNs have been an integral part of my life and have been a key factor in the holistic development of my persona. I have been a member of the Mumbai Model UN circuit for the past 4 years and have participated in a plethora of different committees, albeit I have a fervent propensity for the Security Council. Not only is it regarded as the most formidable principal organ of the UN, but its ability to create instrumental change through its powers enshrined within the charter, make it a committee apart.

Model UNs have not only improved my communication and oratory skills but have helped me a great deal in making more calculated career choices. With great ardor I hope I can eventually work at the international court of justice at Hague as the senior advocate for the Republic of India. I implore you to use Model UNs not only as a platform to debate, but also a medium to refine soft skills and deduce more about future career possibilities. Over my years as a delegate I have accumulated several tricks of the trade from both senior and junior MUNners, and I duly hope that I can impart some of them to you.

My penchant for the finer legalities of an agenda coupled with my adoration for international law, have led to me having a proclivity for comprehensive paperwork and well researched statements that align with a delegate's foreign policy.

In conclusion, it is my primary purpose to make Summit as enjoyable and fulfilling for you, as it will be for me. I assure you that I'm convicted to make this the best Model UN experience you've ever had and I beseech you to help me make this happen.

Regards,

Fatema Kinkhabwala

## **2 HISTORY**

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Following the failure of the League of Nations in the interwar period, the United Nations was set up following World War II, officially established on 24 October 1945. The Security Council has been around as long as the UN itself, alongside the five other main organs of the United Nations (GA, EcoSoC, ICJ, Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat). The Security Council has been constrained in its ability to fully exercise the role that was envisioned for it at the time of its creation due to the almost immediate emergence of the Cold War. With both superpowers as permanent members, and the remaining permanent members split among ideological lines (Western UK and France Socialist PRC), the Security Council could hardly ever take any significant action due to the constant threat of a veto from one or more of its permanent members. The Security Council has been largely unable to take on a notable role in larger military conflicts since 1945, perhaps with the

exception of authorizing the US led intervention in the Korea war. The UN and by extension, the Security Council, has largely focused on authorizing and overseeing peacekeeping missions in conflict zones around the world. Currently, there are 15 active peacekeeping missions, primarily in Africa and the Middle East.

## **3 MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

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The United Nations Security Council is the paramount council of the United Nations with 5 permanent members and 10 rotating members. Its establishment and nature is enshrined in Chapter V of the United Nations Charter. Chapters VI, VII, VII and XII all contain provisions pertaining the powers of the Security Council, which, to alleviate the burden of the shoulders of you delegates, shall be elucidated in the following paragraph. Chapter VI pertains to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, within which, under articles 33 to 38, the Security Council may call upon the settlement of such disputes by the parties involved, investigate such disputes and recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment or resolution of the issue in a pacific manner. Chapter VII deals with the Action with

Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, within which, under articles 39 to 41, the Security Council may determine any of the three aforementioned violations, call upon parties involved to comply with provisional measures and invoke non-armed measures towards the resolution of it. Articles 42 to 50 pertain to the utilization of armed-measures, the procedures towards invoking and carrying out such measures and responsibilities and options for UN member states in light of such measures being employed. Article 51 of the same chapter VII finally iterates the inherent right of member states towards individual and collective self-defence. Chapter VIII contains only articles 52 to 54, which enshrine the practices involving regional arrangements, particularly in regards to how the Security Council may utilize such regional arrangements, but also how these will always require explicit authorization from the Security Council, should they wish to get seriously involved in matters. Finally, we have Chapter XII, which pertains to the International Trusteeship System, under whose articles 83 and 84 mentions the Security Council as the sole approver of terms regarding such trusteeship agreements, as well as the body to whom the administering authority would be obligated as a contractual partner in this agreement. It is vital to note that passage of a resolution in the Security Council is conditional on the affirmative voting of 9 member states and the absence of usage of the veto power, which a certain 5 states hold.

## **4 AGENDA 1- THE CONFLICT IN HAITI**

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### **4.1 INTRODUCTION:**

The situation in Haiti is one of the most alarming socio- economic crises of our time; one that the international community has largely ignored. The economic crisis in Haiti is one that could potentially be one of the worst political crises that the human race has seen so far. A country engulfed by riots, mass upheaval and outright economic turmoil is one that the resort of the world has left to perish; merely because it has no economic significance. As you enter the UNSC, the responsibility of coming up with innovative solutions to a by far

unresolved crisis rests on your shoulders and as the apex body of the UN, the decisions you make and the actions you take will determine the future of the human race.

#### **4.2 CURRENT SITUATION:**

The reason for riots and mass uprising in the nation of Haiti can be best summarised in two words: corruption and recurring- recession. Major corruption scandals involving even the President Jovenel Moise, the ruling party and the President's former chief of staff have left Haitians with no more faith in the ballot. Funds for social welfare schemes have been spent solely on politicians and Haiti's social infrastructure has been ignored completely. Hospitals lack doctors, schools lack teachers and the people have had no option but to get to take to the streets. Inflation is at its highest in years and the real GDP growth rate is at - 14.2%. With one of the lowest average incomes in the world, the average Haitian has resorted to extreme violence: whether it be stone pelting or burning down cars and houses.

In July 2018, the government's announcement that it would eliminate subsidies, allowing fuel prices to increase by up to 50 percent, led to widespread protests and the worst civil unrest the country has seen in years. A resurgence of gang violence has led to further instability. The National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) researched a November 13 incident in La Saline in which it alleges at least 59 people were killed and called for an official investigation, including into the alleged involvement of members of the Haitian National Police and other officials. Haitians remain susceptible to displacement by natural disasters, including tropical storms and hurricanes. In October, an earthquake left 17 people dead and over 350 injured. More than 140,000 households still need decent shelter, more than two years after Hurricane Matthew in which between 540 to 1,000 people died, according to different estimates. As of May 2018, nearly 38,000 people, 70 percent of them women and children, lived in displacement camps formed after the 2010 earthquake. Authorities have not provided assistance to resettle them or return them to their places of origin. As of May, at

least 17 of 26 remaining displacement camps lacked adequate sanitary facilities.

### **4.3 HISTORY:**

The nation of Haiti was founded on the 1st of January, 1804 when it got independence from French colonisers. This was followed by the US occupation of Haiti between 28 July 1915 – 1 August 1934, when Haiti finally got its independence.

Since then, things have not gone as well.

Haitian history has been marred by corruption scandals, soaring inflation and economic recession. After the earthquake of 2010, the US has provided 13 billion

dollars of aid to Haiti, but most claim that majority of this has not been used for the benefit of the 11.1 million Haitians. Petro Caribe was an oil discount scheme financed by Venezuela. It allowed Haiti to delay payment of its oil bills to 25 years after the date of purchase at a meagre 1% interest rate. The money saved was to be used for social welfare utilities, such as funding for healthcare, education and sustainable housing after the earthquake of 2010. The people of Venezuela are not wrong to complain that years after Petro Caribe was introduced, none of the benefits promised seem to be visible.

In this situation, wherein Venezuela is left with a debt of 2 billion dollars in oil debt, the masses have demanded that President Moise, who has been seen to be directly involved in the corruption scandals, resigns. Given the violent riots, the United States has withdrawn any and all non - emergency personnel from the island country.

## 4.4 KEY PLAYERS:

### 1. Haiti National police

Most of the foreign police forces as well as the UNPKF has withdrawn from Haiti, and the situation is all up to the Haitian National police, which is choked of funding.

### 2. Jovenel Moïse government

President Jovenel Moïse has called for his opposition to participate in peaceful dialogue stating "the country's problems aren't solely political. The country's problems are social, economic and political". The national police have stated that there are "malicious individuals" who had interrupted peaceful protests in the country.

### 3. Canada

Beginning in March 1995, 500 Canadian Armed Forces personnel deployed to Haiti to contribute to this international effort. The Canadian contingent included aviation, engineering, transportation and administrative support personnel from across the country. They also provided logistical support and construction engineer services to the UN operations. Canadians remained in the country as new UN missions continued, with up to 650 military personnel helping maintain stability in the country as the Haitian national police were trained. However, Canada, one of Haiti's largest international donors, temporarily closed its embassy because of "the current volatility," while the State Department in Washington ordered the departure of all "non-emergency US personnel."

### 4. Armed Opposition Groups

Various urban gangs and armed "political" groups operating in the capital and other cities. Some urban gangs are mainly political in nature fighting in support of various powerful individuals or factions while some are criminal organizations engaged in inter-

gang fighting, clashes with the HNP and MINUSTAH and at times partake in politically-related fighting out of personal gain. Their numbers have grown with the freeing of numerous prisoners by rebels. Criminal organizations based mainly in the drug and contraband trade who are taking advantage of the collapse of state institutions and have engaged in violent clashes with the HNP and may at times be involved in fighting for political reasons acting as mercenaries for various political groups. "According to information received by Amnesty International, which could not be verified independently, the killers were members of a criminal gang which included escaped prisoners and was led by an escaped convict known as 'Ti Junior.' The gang is reported to be working with the police and the MIF in the identification of Fanmi Lavalas supporters."

#### **4.5 PAST UN ACTIONS:**

##### **United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUSTAH)**

The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH), also known as MINUSTAH, was a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti that was in operation from 2004 to 2017. The mission's military component was led by the Brazilian Army and the force commander was Brazilian. The force is composed of 2,366 military personnel and 2,533 police, supported by international civilian personnel, a local civilian staff and United Nations Volunteer.

MINUSTAH's mandate was extended by a UN resolution past its deadline of 15 October 2010 amid alleged fears of instability. The mission and the mandate was then extended until 15 October 2012 with the intention and has been renewed periodically. On 13 April 2017, the United Nations Security Council announced that the mission will end in October 2017. It is set to be replaced by a follow-up mission: the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which is expected to have just under 1,300 personnel.

##### **Resolution 2476 (2019)**

Adopting resolution 2476 (2019) by 13 votes in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (China, Dominican Republic), the Council requested that the Integrated Office be headed by a Special



Representative tasked with advising the Government of Haiti on strengthening political stability and good governance through support for an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue. Among other duties, the Special Representative will assist in planning and executing elections; reinforcing the Haitian National Police through training on human rights; responding to gang violence; developing an inclusive approach with all segments of society to reduce intercommunal violence; ensuring compliance with international human rights obligations; improving prison oversight; and strengthening the justice sector, notably by adopting and implementing legislation to reform it.

### **Resolution 2410 (2018)**

Adopting resolution 2410 (2018) under Chapter VII the Charter of the United Nations by a recorded vote of 13 in favour to none against with 2 abstentions (China, Russian Federation), the Council extended until 15 April 2019 the mandate of MINUJUSTH — established in 2017 as a follow-up to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) — tasked with assisting the Government in strengthening the rule of law, supporting the national police and monitoring human rights, among other responsibilities. It further decided that MINUJUSTH would maintain 7 formed police units and 295 individual police officers until 15 October 2018 — to be adjusted down to five units between that date and 15 April 2019 — and that it would maintain the 295 individual officers until 15 April 2019.

Deciding that the reduction would take into account Haiti's evolving security situation and be adjusted accordingly, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution every 90 days, beginning on 1 June.

## 5 AGENDA 2- THE SITUATION IN MALI AND THE WORK OF THE MINUSMA

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### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of 2017, more than 1,200 civilians, mostly Fulanis, have been killed in clashes in central Mali, according to the Malian Association for Human Rights, an independent rights group.

Much of the violence has resembled the attack on Gueourou: lethal raids by armed men who burn down villages and steal whatever cattle they can. The perpetrators in many cases are believed to be members of so-called self-defence militias created by the Dogon and Bambara ethnic groups, though jihadists and soldiers with the Malian army have also carried out killings. In response, the Fulanis have created their own self-defence groups, which have been implicated in the deaths of dozens of Dogon villagers.

There have long been tensions between different communities in central Mali over access to land and water—tensions that are being exacerbated by climate change. But the ethnic self-defence militias are a relatively new phenomenon. Many of them have formed in the context of the conflict that began in northern Mali in 2012, the year jihadist groups took over half the country. The ranks of the self-defence militias have continued to swell in response to extrajudicial killings by Malian security forces and the relative absence of the state in the region. A December report by Human Rights Watch documented 26 attacks predominantly targeting the Fulani community, all of them occurring in 2018.

In the case of the June attack on Gueourou, Human Rights Watch determined that the Dogon self-defence militia known as Dan Na Ambassagou had opened fire on dozens of villagers as they gathered for a baptism at the village chief's house. Among the dead were a new-born baby boy—so young he hadn't been given a name—and his grandfather, who was shot in the chest. While the precise motive for the attack is unclear, Human Rights Watch noted in its report that Gueourou was "known for its abundance of

livestock, and that after the attack, the militiamen pillaged several thousand animals, as well as food stocks and jewellery."

This type of violence represents the latest manifestation of the chronic insecurity that has afflicted parts of Mali for the better part of a decade. And it is not the only security challenge facing the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who came to power in 2013 and was re-elected last year. In addition to the ethnic violence in central Mali, Keita's administration is grappling with a long-running Tuareg rebellion in the north and a growing web of jihadist groups that can stage attacks anywhere in the country.

## **5.2 CURRENT SITUATION**

Mali's human rights situation seriously deteriorated in 2018 as attacks by armed Islamist groups against civilians spiked, the army committed atrocities during counterterrorism operations, and intercommunal violence killed hundreds and precipitated a humanitarian crisis. The peace process envisioned to end the 2012-2013 political-military crisis in the north made scant progress, including on disarmament and the restoration of state authority. Rampant banditry continued amid a deepening security vacuum. In central Mali, Islamist group attacks, including with explosive devices on roadways, increased from 2017, killing many villagers. State counterterrorism operations resulted in dozens of summary executions and ill-treatment. During 2018, at least 300 civilians were killed in over 100 incidents of communal violence in central and northern Mali. The violence pitted ethnically aligned self-defence groups against communities accused of supporting Islamist armed groups, resulting in the pillage and destruction of dozens of villages and displacement of tens of thousands. In September, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was sworn in for a second term after winning elections marred by insecurity, allegations of irregularities, and some rights violations, including banned demonstrations and the closure of a local radio station. Little effort was made toward providing justice for victims of abuses, and rule of law institutions remained weak. However, the military opened investigations into allegations of extrajudicial killings by their forces. Humanitarian agencies suffered scores of attacks, mostly by bandits, which undermined their ability

to deliver aid. During 2018, Mali's international partners focused on containing the regional spread of Islamist group attacks and ensuring legitimate presidential elections. These actors demonstrated increased willingness to denounce abuses by Malian security forces.

### 5.3 HISTORY

#### 2012

- 16 January - 17 January: Battle of Ménaka between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the army of Mali. On the 17th, fighting spread to towns of Aguelhok and Tessalit
- 1 February: After regaining the town of Ménaka after the battle in January, the military of Mali retreats and the MNLA takes the town over.
- 2 February: Large-scale protests against the violence in the north take place in Bamako, the capital of Mali, and cause disruptions and shut down much of the city.
- 11 March: The MNLA (and allies) take over Tessalit.
- 14 March: Rebel forces took control of the towns of Diré and Goundam
- 21 March- 22 March: 2012 Malian coup d'état, disgruntled soldiers took over the capital city and on the morning of the 22nd, Amadou Konare went on state television, which identified him as the spokesperson of the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), formed by the renegade soldiers. Konare declared that the soldiers had seized power from 'the incompetent regime of Amadou Toumani Touré' and said it would look to hand over power to a new, democratically elected government.
- 2 April: ECOWAS and Mauritanian and Algeria place wide-ranging sanctions on the military government of Mali

- 3 April: Armed groups looted 2,354 tons of food from United Nations' World Food Programme's warehouses in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, causing the WFP to suspend its operations in northern Mali.
- 4 April: Civil society and 50 political parties in Mali refuse to take part in a discussion with the military government on plans for the future.
- 6 April: The MNLA declares independence of the northern part of Mali.
- 8 April: The National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA) announced its formation and intention to oppose Tuareg rule, battle the MNLA, and "return to peace and economic activity"; the group claimed to consist of 500 fighters.
- 8 April: President Amadou Toumani Touré resigns and Dioncounda Traoré is named interim President.
- 4 May: Ansar Dine members reportedly burned the tomb of a Sufi saint
- 8 June: MNLA and Ansar Dine forces fight with one another in Kidal, killing two in the skirmish, as a result of protests in the city opposed to the imposition of Sharia law
- 26 June - 27 June: Battle of Gao started when protesters opposed to Tuareg rule by the MNLA resulted in two deaths
- 29 June: Islamists are in charge of most of northern Mali and the MNLA holds few cities.
- 24 September: A group broke off from the MNLA, calling itself the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad (FPA), aiming to focus efforts on fighting the Islamists.
- 12 October 2012: United Nations Security Council unanimously passes United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 which approved the creation of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).
- 11 December: Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra is forced to resign by the military

## 2013

- 4 January: A ceasefire between Ansar Dine and the army of Mali is ended by Ansar Dine claiming the terms were not met.
- 11 January: France launched Opération Serval, militarily intervening in the conflict
- 12 January: The British government announced that it was deploying two Royal Air Force C-17 transport planes in a non-combat role to ferry primarily French but also potentially African forces into Mali.
- 14 January - 21 January: Battle of Diabaly begins with the Malian army, and possibly French special forces, fighting against Islamists in the city of Diabaly
- 25–27 January: Second Battle of Gao

### 5.4 KEY PLAYERS

#### 1. The Ethnic Rebels

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (known by its French acronym of MNLA) is ethnically driven, fighting mostly for the rights of Mali's minority Tuareg community. It was formed by Malian Tuareg in 2011, as a successor to previous rebel groups. During Col Muammar Gaddafi's rule in Libya, many Malian Tuareg joined his army, in a move that was welcomed by Mali's government to end conflict within its borders. After Col Gaddafi's overthrow in 2011, they returned to Mali, swelling the ranks of the MNLA as it spearheaded an uprising against the Malian army, in alliance with the Islamists.

#### 2. Islamist Rebel Groups

The five main Islamists groups in Mali are Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Signed-in-Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). Ansar Dine is seen as a home-grown movement, led by renowned former Tuareg

rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly. Its objective is to impose Islamic law across Mali and its full name in Arabic is Harakat Ansar al-Dine, which translates as "movement of defenders of the faith". In contrast, AQIM - the north African wing of al-Qaeda - has its roots in the bitter Algerian civil war of the early 1990s, but has since evolved to take on a more international Islamist agenda.

### 3. **Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)**

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. By unanimously adopting resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014, the Council further decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country.

### 4. **France**

Officially, French President François Hollande launched operation Serval in January 2013 to prevent jihadist armed groups from reaching Bamako and to restore Mali's territorial integrity. During the summer of 2012, the jihadist armed groups had taken over the rebellion from the separatists and had begun imposing their rule over the northern territories of Mali. In December, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of an African force (AFISMA), which is likely what prompted the jihadists to move south a few weeks later, towards the strategic airport at Sévaré, in Central Mali. These

troop movements were interpreted in Paris as a threat to Bamako, and thus as a cause for triggering operation Serval.

## **5. G5 Sahel States**

The G5 Sahel, which is headquartered in Nouakchott, is an intergovernmental cooperation framework created on 16 February 2014 at the initiative of the Mauritanian Presidency of the African Union. It seeks to fight insecurity and support development with a view to opening up the region. On 2 July 2017, G5 Sahel leaders officially launched the Cross-Border Joint Force in Bamako, pooling their resources to fight security threats in the Sahel region. The United Nations Security Council welcomed the creation of this Joint Force in Resolution 2359 of 21 June 2017, which was sponsored by France. The Joint Force has successfully carried out several operations, with others planned for 2019. It is intended to be flexible in order to adapt to the changing threat environment and intervention priorities. It does not replace but rather supplements the operations of the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the mandate of which is to support the Malian authorities in stabilizing their country. The relationship between the Joint Force and MINUSMA is governed by Resolution 2391 of 8 December 2017, under which the latter provides operational and logistical support to the former.

## **5.5 PAST UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS**

### **Resolution 2391 (2017)**

Unanimously adopting resolution 2391 (2017), the Council requested the Secretary-General to conclude a technical agreement among the United Nations, the European Union and G5 Sahel States [Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger], with a view to providing operational and logistical support through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the joint force conducting cross-border counter-terrorist operations across the region. Such support should be



subject to full financial reimbursement to the United Nations through a European Union-coordinated mechanism, the Council stated.

### **Resolution 2432 (2018)**

Unanimously adopting resolution 2432 (2018) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council renewed the travel ban and assets freeze until 31 August 2019 on individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017). It also renewed its request to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts, expressing its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2019.

### **Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (2018)**

On May 4, 2018, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC) adopted its second set of conclusions on children and armed conflict in Mali. The Working Group first met in March to review the Secretary-General's second report on the situation of children and armed conflict in Mali, which was published in February 2018, and negotiations lasted approximately two months. Watch list made targeted recommendations to Working Group members at the start of their negotiations, outlined in the April 2018 Children and Armed Conflict Monthly Update, all of which were reflected in some form in the final conclusions. Watch list hopes for the complete implementation of the concluding recommendations, particularly the signing and development of action plans to end and prevent all violations and abuses committed against children.

### **The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)**

The Panel is mandated by resolution 2374 (2017) to: assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017).